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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the effect of the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences regime 
on exports from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to 
the European Union (EU). With this aim, an augmented gravity model is estimated for exports 
from the 79 ACP countries to the EU-15 for the time period 1995 to 2005 using panel data 
techniques. The model estimates are used to quantify the effect of the EBA preferences on the 
ACP LDCs’ export performance and to compare it with the impact of official development 
assistance. In addition to their separate effects, the combined impact of EBA and aid flows is 
estimated. The main results show a negative effect of the EBA regime on exports. Otherwise, 
the combined effect of the EBA and aid on exports is positive, supporting an EU development 
strategy that includes both sorts of assistance, aid and trade preferences. 
JEL Classification: O24; C23; F13; F35 
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1. Introduction 
Trade preferences were initially established in the development debate as a sort of aid to 
developing countries (DCs). The development debate turned its focus on trade as a more 
effective way of ensuring growth and economic and social prosperity in the DCs because of 
the mixed outcomes of aid programmes (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman, 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Morrisey, 2006). Hence, a special and differential 
treatment  regime  was  introduced  within  the  GATT/WTO  framework  in  order  to  promote 
DCs’ exports without exposing their home industries to higher competition.  
This study will focus on trade preferences offered by the European Union (EU) and in 
particular on the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences regime, which is targeted 
exclusively at least developed countries (LDCs). The expectations about the EBA initiative 
have been very high, setting the hopes that this new scheme will deliver the breakthrough in 
the economic development of the poorest countries in the world. In contrast, this study will 
present  arguments,  which  highlight  the  various  threats  of  implementing  trade  preference 
regimes, not only to the beneficiary countries but also to the WTO framework.  
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  twofold:  First,  to  examine  the  influence  of  the  EBA 
preferences on the ACP LDCs’ export performance and second, to compare the impact of the 
EBA scheme with the effect of official development assistance (ODA). In addition to their 
separate effects the combined impact of EBA and aid flows will also be analysed. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that specifically evaluates the influence of the EBA regime 
and  compares  trade  preferences  and  development  aid  as  development  tools  within  the 
framework of the gravity model of trade. With this aim, a gravity model augmented with aid 
and trade preferences variables is estimated for exports from the ACP countries to the EU-15 
over the period 1995 to 2005 with the help of different econometric techniques – random- and 
fixed-effects, Hausman-Taylor estimator and Heckman regression method.    3 
The main findings show that the EBA agreement seems to have exactly the opposite 
effect as its goals: instead of increasing the size of exports the arrangement actually reduces it. 
In  contrast,  the  interaction  effect  between  EBA  and  ODA  turns  out  to  be  a  significant 
determinant of exports from ACP LDCs to the EU-15, showing a small and positive effect on 
exports. The ODA variable has different sign and significance level in the estimations and the 
results are not robust to changes in the specification of the model. It appears that neither the 
EBA scheme nor the ODA achieve their goals on its own but a mixed strategy using both 
development approaches seems to have a significant positive effect on LDCs’ exports to the 
EU. 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the EBA initiative and its 
characteristics. Section 3 presents a literature review and Section 4 analyses the empirical 
effects of the EBA arrangement on trade. Finally, some conclusions are outlined in Section 5.  
 
2. The EBA Initiative: A New Option for LDCs? 
The EBA arrangement is part of the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) since it 
became effective on March 5
th 2001. Compared to the eligibility criteria for the general GSP 
scheme, the EBA agreement is specifically targeted towards the LDCs defined on the basis of 
the UN definition for a LDC
1. The objective of this section is to outline the areas where the 
arrangement offers LDCs real possibilities to improve their situation and also to highlight the 
disadvantages linked with it. 
The  major  advantage  of  the  EBA  agreement  is  the  unlimited  time  period  of  its 
implementation (Brenton, 2003; Messerlin, Nielson and Zedillo, 2005; Inama, 2006). Due to 
the fact that the arrangement is not subject to periodical renewal, as the general EU GSP 
scheme,  it  offers  higher  certainty  for  exporters  from  LDCs  and  facilitates  investment 
decisions.  It  is  also  an  incentive  to  diversify  the  export  structure  and  to  invest  in  new   4 
industries  and  products  with  the  aim  of  promoting  industrialisation.  No  other  preference 
agreement so far has been so advanced in this aspect. 
Other positive characteristics of the EBA arrangement concern product and country 
coverage,  and  tariff  cuts  (Inama,  2006).  Meanwhile,  all  products  are  covered  under  the 
agreement
2,  including  additional  919  HS8
3  product  lines  compared  to  the  general  GSP 
scheme,  which  makes  EBA  the  most  generous  of  all  preferential  agreements  (EC 
No.980/2005; UNCTAD 2002). Indeed, the LDCs can specialize in the products in which 
they have comparative advantage and be ready to face future competition pressures when they 
will be no longer eligible for the EBA agreement. In addition, there are no more duties or 
quotas, which can hinder the take-off of the preferential scheme. It is also worth noting that 
the preferential access is available for all LDCs without any exclusion and hence the trade 
diversion effect is not supposed to outweigh the trade creation effect. 
Although substantial steps have been made to improve the design of the EU trade 
preferences to LDCs, the EBA scheme is still far from perfect. While the inclusion of all 
LDCs  without  exceptions  in  the  arrangement  can  be  seen  as  a  positive  achievement,  the 
majority of DCs are still disadvantaged because the LDCs are more preferred in comparison 
to them (Kennan and Stevens, 2001; Hewitt and Page, 2002; Messerlin, Nielson and Zedillo, 
2005). This fact may lead to potential losses for the non-LDC DCs, which still face tariffs and 
quotas for their exports. It is assumed that especially for the non-LDC ACP countries this 
negative  effect  can  be  significant  since  all  ACP  countries  directly  compete  in  the  same 
industries  (Kennan  and  Stevens,  2001;  Hewitt  and  Page,  2002;  Messerlin,  Nielson  and 
Zedillo, 2005).  
The increase of exports and diversification of the export structure are some of the main 
goals of the EBA agreement. However, neither of both objectives has been achieved. The 
LDC Report of UNCTAD (2008) shows that despite of high growth rates of exports, which 
are the main driver of the economic performance of LDCs, their export structure remains   5 
concentrated  on  primary  commodities  and  low-skilled,  labour-intensive  manufactures. 
Primary commodities including fuels comprised 77% of the LDCs’ merchandise exports in 
the  years  2005  and  2006  (UNCTAD,  2008).  The  report  also  underlines  the  significant 
difference  between  the  African  and  the  Asian  LDCs.  While  the  Asian  ones  are  more 
specialized in the production of manufactured goods the exports of the African LDCs consist 
almost completely of primary products and fuels, which made 91.5% of their exports in the 
years 2005 and 2006.  
The assumption that the EBA would have higher utilization rates than the other GSP 
schemes can be doubted on the basis of the available data. In the first place, the export share 
of the 919 products liberalized with the introduction of the EBA agreement has remained very 
low, 0.03% of total LDCs’ exports to the EU in 2001 (Brenton, 2003). Second, the three 
products with delayed liberalization - bananas, rice and sugar - had an export share of 0.47% 
of total LDCs’ exports to the EU in 2001. The figures show that the new liberalized products 
are not of much relevance for the LDCs and have had a very low share in the LDCs’ exports, 
at least in the first year of implementation of EBA.  
Total imports entering duty free under the EBA regime reached €5.8 billion in 2008, 
which represents only 23% of total imports into the EU from LDCs
4. In contrast, for the Asian 
LDCs the EBA regime is a great opportunity to improve their export structure and revenues 
so  they  are  actually  the  effective  users  of  the  arrangement  (Kennan  and  Stevens,  2001; 
Brenton, 2003). For instance, Bangladesh managed to gradually increase its utilization of 
EBA preferences from about 60% in 2002 to almost 80% in 2008, and its imports under EBA 
have more than double since
5. 
In addition, the fact that in 2001 none of the ACP LDCs requested a preferential 
access under the EBA arrangement is striking (Brenton, 2003). Although there were goods 
exported from ACP LDCs to the EU, which were eligible for a preferential status, the latter 
was not requested. This situation has occurred because most of the ACP LDCs still export   6 
mainly under the conditions of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (UNCTAD, 2007). Since 
2001 the ACP LDCs are eligible to export to the EU under two different agreements: the 
Cotonou
6 (at least until 2008) and the EBA. UNCTAD (2007) shows an extremely high utility 
ratio
7 of the Cotonou Agreement, fluctuating between 65% and 80% in the period from 1998 
to 2004. Apparently, for the ACP LDCs it has been more profitable to export under the 
Cotonou Agreement than under the EBA scheme.  
The reasons lie in the different rules of origin and administrative requirements of both 
agreements. Compared to the Cotonou Agreement the rules of origin and the administrative 
requirements  under  the  EBA  regime  are  much  stricter  (UNCTAD,  2001;  Brenton,  2003; 
Candau, Fontagne and Jean, 2004; Messerlin, Nielson and Zedillo, 2005). For the ACP LDCs 
using  the  EBA  regime  means  additional  documentation,  new  rules  of  origin  and  other 
regulations about cumulation. Under the Cotonou agreement the ACP countries enjoy the 
right of full cumulation, contrary to EBA. In this way all ACP countries together are regarded 
as one customs territory and therefore “manufacturing operations may be carried out in every 
beneficiary country” (UNCTAD, 2001).  
  Although  the  restrictive  rules  of  origin  and  administrative  requirements  are  often 
considered to be the main reasons for the underutilization of the EBA regime, there are also 
other  possible  explanations.  The  utilization  of  trade  preferences  depends  on  the  national 
conditions  and  specifically  on  the  supply  capacity  of  the  recipient  country  (Kennan  and 
Stevens,  2001;  Hewitt  and  Page,  2002).  The  EBA  agreement  is  targeted  at  the  poorest 
countries  in  the  world.  Hence,  it  is  plausible  to  assume  that  they  possess  only  a  limited 
capacity to produce and export more goods. Transport, infrastructure and potential to adjust 
the production structure are some of the conditions for effective participation of the EBA 
regime. If these are not available it cannot be expected that the beneficiary countries will 
experience an increase in their exports. Preferential market access on its own is not sufficient 
to solve the supply-side constraints of the LDCs. Hence, it is essential that exporters have   7 
simultaneously  access  to  a  functioning  financial  and  credit  market  in  order  to  afford 
restructuring of the production facilities (Jensen and Yu, 2005).  
   
3. Overview of Empirical Studies Evaluating the EBA Scheme 
There are two clearly differentiated strands in the empirical literature. The first strand of studies 
uses computable general equilibrium models to quantify the effect of  implementing the EBA 
initiative. Usually such models are employed to forecast the future impact of given policies on the 
exports and welfare of DCs and on the EU. In the second strand we find studies that use the 
gravity model of trade to estimate the effects of the initiatives on bilateral trade flows, taking into 
account that this regime may result not only in greater imports from beneficiary countries but may 
also divert trade away from non-beneficiary countries.  
Evenett  (2009)  presents  a  comprehensive  survey  of  studies  based  on  the  general 
equilibrium model. Three studies are closely related to our paper and consider in particular 
the EBA agreement: Somwaru and Trueblood (2002); Cernat, Laird, Monge-Raffarello and 
Turrini (2003) and Jensen and Yu (2005). According to these studies the gains to LDCs from 
the  EBA  scheme  lie  between  US$300-400  million,  whereas  it i s  f o u n d  the  EU  to  have  cost 
between US$200-300 million. Since some of the effects for third DCs are negative and all kind of 
non-tariff barriers have been neglected, the world net-welfare effect of this initiative could be 
close to zero. 
In the second strand of the literature, there are a number of very recent studies that use 
the gravity model to estimate the effects on trade of different preference schemes (Evenett, 
2009). We focus on the main findings of three of them that are closely related to our work: 
Persson  and  Wilhemsson  (2006);  Verdeja  (2007)  and  Gamberoni ( 2007).  Persson  and 
Wilhemsson (2006) estimate a gravity model using panel data techniques (fixed effects) on a 
large sample of EU importers and developing country exporters over the period 1960-2002. 
The main findings are that certain preference schemes have had large effects on DCs exports–   8 
the largest are found for the ACP countries, where the preferences increase exports by about 
30 %. Verdeja (2007) estimates cross-sectional and panel data gravity model for ten different 
periods between 1973 and 2000, using several estimation techniques. They obtain a negative 
and significant effect of the EU GSP when using a two-stage fixed effect estimator proposed 
by  Martínez-Zarzoso  and  Nowak-Lehmann  (2003),  which  might  result  from  the  low 
utilization rate of GSP preferences. A slightly different approach is followed by Gamberoni 
(2007). The author decomposes the total value of trade into the extensive margin (number of 
products  traded)  and  the  intensive  margin  (average  value  traded)  and  then  estimates  the 
effects of trade preferences on each margin. It is the only paper within the gravity model 
framework that specifically considers the EBA regime, together with another three unilateral 
preference programs. Interestingly, the main findings indicate that the ACP and the EBA 
regimes decrease trade (conditional on trade being present) by 11% and 19% respectively and 
also both regimes decrease the number of products traded (extensive margin of trade). This 
later effect implies an anti-diversification bias effect of these preferences. 
 
4. Empirical Estimations of the Effect of the EBA Initiative 
4.1 Model Specification, Data and Main Results  
The effect of the EBA initiative on the ACP countries’ exports will be estimated with the use 
of the gravity model. The use of the gravity equation to explain bilateral trade flows was 
pioneered by Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) and meanwhile theoretically justified 
(Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1989; Deardoff, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The 
gravity  model  is  today  often  used  in  explaining  bilateral  trade  flows  between  different 
countries or examining trade creation and diversion effects of free trade areas (e.g. Oguledo 
and Macphee, 1994; Carrère, 2006). However, in the field of trade preferences and especially 
with respect to the EBA initiative there are, to our knowledge, only a few empirical studies 
that use this method (Evenett, 2009). The gravity equation has the advantage that it takes into   9 
account the supply changes in the DCs and respectively the demand changes in the developed 
countries.  It  considers  also  a  long-run  equilibrium  view  of  trade  patterns  between  two 
countries (Nilsson, 1997). A similar method as in this analysis is applied by Nilsson (2002) 
who examined the effect of EU’s GSP and the Lomé Convention and by the abovementioned 
studies (Persson and Wilhemsson, 2006; Verdeja, 2007 and Gamberoni, 2007). The most 
important differences between these studies and the gravity model estimated in this paper is 
that whereas those mainly examined the effect of different GSP regimes, we focus specifically 
on the effect of the EBA regime and we also consider the effect of development assistance on 
trade and the combined effect of both development strategies -EBA and ODA- on exports. 
The  gravity  equation  is  estimated  for  bilateral  trade  flows  between  the  79  ACP 
countries and the EU-15 for the time period between 1995 and 2005. 41 out of the 79 ACP 
countries were during the time period also LDCs, with Senegal and Timor-Leste being added 
from the UN to the LDC list in 2000 and 2003 respectively
8. A list of the exporter (ACP) and 
importer (EU-15) countries is provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The data is taken from 
different databases: the figures for distance, colonial history and common language are from 
the CEPII database
9. The GDP and population values for the ACP countries are extracted 
from the UNCTAD database
10, the population size of the EU-15 countries and trade figures 
from EUROSTAT
11 and the GDP for the EU-15 countries and ODA disbursements are from 
the OECD database
12. 
We focus on ACP countries for two reasons. First, all ACP countries have a very 
similar export structure and are direct competitors in some industries so it will be interesting 
to see whether the EBA scheme gives an advantage for the ACP LDCs compared to the non-
LDC  ACP  countries.  Second,  it  is  of  special  interest  to  examine  whether  the  EBA 
introduction has had an impact exactly on the ACP LDCs’ exports because before the EBA 
scheme they have already had greater preferential market access to the EU compared to the 
other DCs.    10 
  The gravity equation in its log-linear form, which is applied in this investigation, is 
given by: 
lnXjit = β ji + β 1 lnGDPjt + β 2 lnGDPit + β3 lnPOPjt + β 4 lnPOPit + β 5 lnDISTji + 
β6lnODAjit + β7 COLj + β8 ISLANDj + β9 LANDLOCKEDj + β10 COMMONLANGj + 
β11 EBAjt + β12 lnODAjit*EBAjt + εjit            (1) 
 
where:  
lnXjit stands for the logarithmic exports from ACP country j to EU-15 country i in year t, in 
current US dollars. 
lnGDPjt and lnGDPit are respectively the logarithmic gross domestic products of the exporter 
and importer country, both in current US dollars. 
lnPOPjt and lnPOPit present the logarithmic population size of countries j and i. 
lnDISTji is the logarithmic distance in kilometres between the most important cities in terms 
of population in each country calculated following the great circle formula. 
lnODAijt is the first lag of the logarithmic of official development assistance received by ACP 
country j from EU-15 country i in US dollars.  
COLj and COMMONLANGj are binary variables indicating whether the exporting country 
has a colonial link or a common official language with the importing country. 
ISLANDj  and  LANDLOCKEDj  are  dummy  variables,  taking  the  value  of  one  when  the 
exporting country j is respective an island or landlocked. 
EBAjt is a dummy variable indicating eligibility for the EBA scheme.  
lnODAjit*EBAjt is an interaction term between the EBA dummy variable and the lnODA 
variable showing their joint influence. 
βji are country-pair effects and εjit is the error term, which is assumed to be iid. 
The summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1.   11 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
  Expectations about the sign and effect of the independent variables on exports can be 
drawn from theory and from the simple correlation statistics. Since higher GDP indicates 
higher supply capacity in the exporting country and higher import demand in the importing 
country it is expected that both GDP variables shall have a positive sign. The sign of the 
population variables is ambiguous. On the one side, a bigger country could export more than a 
smaller country because economies of scale can be better employed and import more because 
consumers demand a wider variety of goods. On the other side, large population leads to a 
large domestic market and hence higher self-sufficiency and higher absorption effect within 
the  country.  Since  distance  is  used  as  a  measure  for  transport  and  transaction  costs  it  is 
expected that its coefficient will have a negative effect on bilateral trade flows. The two 
dummy variables for colonial history and common language are assumed to induce exports 
from the ACP countries to the EU-15. A negative impact of the binary variables for being an 
island or landlocked could be expected due to higher transport costs associated to a more 
difficult market access in these cases. For the EBA coefficient a positive sign is expected 
although it may be insignificant because of its underutilization on the side of the ACP LDCs. 
The expectations for the ODA coefficient are mixed. Earlier studies find that development 
assistance could have both negative and positive effects on exports.  
  Table 2 presents the simple correlation statistics. 
 
Table 2. Simple Correlations 
 
Our expectations about the sign of the explanatory variables can be confirmed except 
for  one.  Contrary  to  our  assumption  the  simple  correlation  between  EBA  and  exports,   12 
presented in Table 2, is negative.  In contrast, EBA and ODA together seem to have a positive 
influence on exports from the ACP LDCs to the EU-15. 
The gravity model is estimated using different econometric methods. First, in order to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity three panel-data models have been estimated: a random 
effects model, a fixed effects model and a Hausman-Taylor model. Second, to account for 
zero export values in the dependent variable a two-step Heckman model is also estimated 
taking into account the panel-data structure of our dataset. Time dummies have been added to 
all regressions and in addition, an interaction term between them and the EBA dummy has 
been included. The model is estimated first including only the EBA dummy and afterwards 
adding ODA and the interaction term between both as a first robustness check. As the results 
show,  there  are  no  significant  differences  in  the  estimated  coefficients  using  the  same 
econometric method. Table 3 offers a summary of the estimation outcomes of the fixed and 
random effects, and Hausman-Taylor model. 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results 
 
  Comparing  the  outcome  of  the  random  and  fixed  effects  regressions  offers  some 
interesting  results.  The  GDP  variables  have  the  same  sign  in  both  regressions  but, 
surprisingly, the GDP of the importer country turns out to have a negative effect on the 
bilateral exports that is significant only in one specification using fixed and random effects. A 
substantial difference is found between both estimation methods concerning the signs and 
significance levels of the population variables. While in the random effects regression both 
population variables turn out to be significantly positive the fixed effects estimation shows the 
opposite influence. This indicates that the population variables are probably correlated with 
the random effects. Since distance, colonial history, common language, landlocked and island 
are time-invariant dummies only the random effects regression provides estimation of their   13 
effects. As assumed, distance has a negative influence on exports implying that transport costs 
are  still  a  significant  obstacle  to  trade.  Having  a  colonial  history  or  a  common  language 
amplifies as suggested significantly the size of the trade flows. The dummy for island has a 
positive sign but it is not statistically significant. Being a landlocked country is plausibly a 
barrier to trade flows. Taking a look at the time dummies and the interaction effects between 
them and the EBA dummy indicates that barely one of them is significant.  
Turning  to  the  variables  of  most  relevance  for  this  study  shows  some  interesting 
results. The most surprising outcome is the highly significant and very strong negative impact 
of the EBA dummy on exports in both regressions, irrespective of whether ODA is included 
in the regression equation or not. The EBA agreement does not seem to foster exports; it 
actually decreases their value in the absence of additional aid. In contrast, the interaction 
effect between EBA and ODA turns out to be positive and highly significant as a determinant 
of exports from the ACP LDCs to the EU-15. The ODA variable performs differently in both 
regressions (fixed effects, random effects) but it is always insignificant. It appears that neither 
the EBA scheme nor the ODA achieve their goals on its own but a mixed strategy using both 
development approaches seems to have a significant positive effect on LDCs’ exports.  
 The Hausman-Taylor technique allows for some but not all of the regressors to be 
correlated with the individual effects (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). In this way it solves the 
“all or nothing choice” between the fixed and random effects concerning the endogeneity 
between the regressors and the individual effects (Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte, 2003). The 
variables are divided into three groups
13: endogenous (population and ODA), time-variant 
exogenous (GDP, EBA and interaction term between EBA and ODA, time dummies and 
interaction effect between time dummies and EBA) and time-invariant exogenous (distance, 
colonial  history,  common  language,  and  island  and  landlocked).  The  results  from  the 
Hausman-Taylor regression can be found in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3. Alternatively, the   14 
model is estimated with fixed country-pair effects and without the time-invariant dummies. 
The results concerning the variables of interest are unchanged
14. 
  As in the previous two regressions the GDP of the exporting country has a significant 
positive influence on exports while the GDP of the importing country affects negatively the 
bilateral trade flows. Again the population of the importing country has a remarkable strong 
significant positive effect on exports. This outcome may be explained by the fact that the 
importing countries, in this case the EU-15, offer many opportunities through their big market 
for the ACP exporters. The sign of distance is not robust to specifications but insignificant. 
Only the dummy for common language is significant and affects exports positively. The EBA 
dummy has, as in the previous estimations, a significant, strong and robust negative influence 
on exports. ODA is insignificant and the interaction term between them positively significant. 
Almost none of the time dummies and the interaction effects between them and the EBA 
dummy is significant, except for the case including only the EBA dummy in the regression 
equation  when  the  time  dummies  for  the  years  2001  to  2005  and  the  interaction  term 
EBA*2005 become significantly positive. 
A log-linear form of the gravity equation, which has been used, drops out all zero 
bilateral  flows  (almost  20%  in  our  sample).  However,  through  dropping  out  these  flows 
relevant  information  about  the  bilateral  trade  patterns  of  the  pair  of  countries  is  lost. 
Therefore, as many authors argue, leaving out the zero flows can lead to a possible sample 
selection  bias  (de  Groot  and  Linders,  2006;  Heckman,  1979;  Helpman,  Melitz  and 
Rubenstein, 2008). For that reason, Heckman (1979) considers the sample selection bias as a 
specification error and suggests a two-stage model where at the first stage the probability of 
existence  of  trade  flows  is  estimated  (the  selection  equation).  In  the  second  stage,  the 
influence of the variables on the volume of trade flows is measured conditional on the fact 
that the flows are positive.  The Heckman selection model is specified as follows:   15 
1.  Selection equation, where πjit represents the probability of export from country j to 
country i in year t: 
 πjit = γ0 + γ1lnGDPjt + γ2lnGDPit + γ3lnPOPjt + γ4lnPOPit + γ5lnDISTji + γ6lnODAjit + 
γ7COLj +  γ8ISLANDj +  γ9LANDLOCKEDj +  γ 10COMMONLANGj +  γ11EBAjt +  
γ12lnODAjit*EBAjt + µjit                (2) 
2. Gravity equation: 
lnXjit =  β ij +  β 1lnGDPjt +  β 2lnGDPit  +  β3lnPOPjt +  β 4lnPOPit +  β 5lnDISTjt +  
β6lnODAjit +  β 7COLj +  β 8ISLANDj +  β 9LANDLOCKEDj +  β 10EBAjt +  
β11lnODAjit*EBAjt + εjit                (3) 
 
The variable, which is used as a “selection rule” and is therefore included only in the selection 
equation,  is  the  common  language  dummy.  Using  other  variables  (island  or  landlocked) 
delivers similar results. The estimation results of the Heckman model are presented in Table 
4, including again first only the EBA dummy, in the second step EBA and ODA and finally 
introducing  also  the  interaction  term  between  both.  Since  there  is  only  one  significant 
difference in the estimated coefficients (the significance level of the exporter population in 
the second stage) we refer in the following discussion to the Heckman model with all three 
variables.  
The  results  of  the  Heckman  model  illustrate  a  more  detailed  picture  of  how  the 
regressors influence bilateral exports. Some variables change either their sign or significance 
level between the two stages of the model. Such examples are the GDP of the importing 
country, which influences positively the probability of exports to take place but negatively 
their value. The same can be monitored for the population of the exporting country whereas 
the variable changes also its significance level. The most important difference between the 
Heckman  model  and  the  previous  regressions  lies  in  the  significance  level  of  the  ODA   16 
variable.  ODA  is  significant  at  the  one  percent  level  in  both  equations.  It  appears  that 
development assistance has a small positive influence on the probability of trade flows to take 
place and a slightly higher effect on their volume: a 10% increase in ODA increases exports 
from ACP countries to EU countries by 1.6%. In comparison, the EBA dummy shows still a 
strong negative effect on exports: an ACP country exports 84% ([exp(-1.83)-1]*100) less 
when it is eligible for the EBA scheme than when it is not. Important is also the outcome of 
the  interaction  term  between  both  variables.  It  is  in  both  stages  positive  but  only  in  the 
selection  regression  significant,  indicating  that  the  probability  of  exporting  to  the  EU 
increases for ACP LDCs eligible for the EBA scheme with higher levels of aid. Interpreting 
the results would lead to the conclusion that ODA is an effective development strategy also 
on its own while the EBA scheme leads rather to the opposite effect. A mixed approach, 
including both strategies, has a small positive effect on the probability to export. Looking at 
the time dummies, those for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 affect positively the 
exports development from the ACP countries to the EU-15, similar to the results from the 
Hausman-Taylor model including only EBA. These results can be interpreted as an increase 
of ACP exports over time due to external factors. In contrast, none of the interaction effects 
between  the  time  dummies  and  the  EBA  variable  are  significant,  pointing  towards  the 
ineffectiveness of the introduction of the EBA scheme in 2001. 
 
4.2 Robustness 
In this sub-section a number of robustness checks are considered in order to validate our 
results. First, we investigate whether our estimation suffers from sample selection due to the 
important amount of zero values in the ODA variable (44%). Since the model is estimated in 
logarithms,  the  observations  with  zero  values  are  dropped  from  the  estimation  and  that 
prevent us from using the full sample (12615 observations). We re-estimated the model with 
the ODA variable in levels (in thousand million US dollar). The results from the estimations   17 
using the Heckman procedure show that the effect of ODA is still positive and significant and 
the effect of EBA is negative and significant, although smaller in magnitude
15. The results for 
the gravity and the selection equations are shown in the first and second columns of Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Robustness 
 
Second, the gravity model is estimated with a different set of fixed effects, namely 
exporter-and-time and importer-and-time fixed effects, in addition to the dyadic fixed effects, 
as suggested by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). The outcome of the estimation is shown in the 
last column of Table 5. The main difference encountered with respect to the results presented 
in Tables 3 and 4 is that the EBA coefficient is not statistically significant; otherwise the 
results  are  almost  the  same  concerning  the  positive  and  significant  coefficient  of  the 
interaction  between  ODA  and  EBA,  which  magnitude  is  the  same.  To  combine  this 
methodology with the Heckman model we also estimated a two-step model with a selection 
equation and a gravity equation with the abovementioned set of fixed effects obtaining similar 
results
16. 
Third, we deal with the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and correct 
for both allowing for a more flexible structure in the error terms and using Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998)  standard  errors  for  coefficients  estimated  by  fixed-effects  (within)  regression.  The 
error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to three lags and possibly 
correlated between panels. These standard errors are robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
(spatial) and temporal dependence. The main results remain unchanged.  
Next, the model is estimated separately for countries receiving aid and for countries 
not receiving aid and the results concerning the negative and significant effect of the EBA 
regime are unchanged
17. Finally, we estimate the effect of EBA and ODA on export flows 
only  for  the  restricted  sample  of  LDCs  using  the  Heckman  selection  model.  Results  are   18 
presented in Table 5 (columns 3-4 only with EBA and columns 5-6 also with EBA, ODA and 
their combined effect). The EBA dummy maintains its negative and significant sign in both 
specifications, with and without ODA and the interaction term. Development assistance still 
has a positive effect on the probability and the volume of exports from the ACP LDCs to the 
EU-15. Compared with the results from the Heckman estimation using the full sample of 
countries  the  interaction  term  between  EBA  and  ODA  turns  out  to  have  in  this  case 
significant influence on the magnitude and not on the probability to export. 
 
4.3 Policy Implications 
A number of conclusions can be drawn for political actions concerning the questions which 
were examined through the estimation: Is the EBA initiative promoting exports of ACP LDCs 
and what is its effect compared to ODA?  
With respect to the first question and regarding the Heckman selection model as the 
most reliable model, the estimation results point out that the EBA initiative fell short of the 
success, which was expected. In contrast to these results, the empirical studies which were 
presented at first in the empirical part showed a modest but throughout a constant positive 
influence of the EBA scheme on the exports of LDCs. This difference may be attributed to the 
fact that the results from the general equilibrium models are overestimated, as they do not 
regard rules of origin or other administrative requirements, which act as non-tariff barriers. 
Our results are however in accordance with the evidence found by Gamberoni (2007) who 
also considered the existence of zero trade flows and found a negative effect of the EBA 
regime on LDCs exports. 
It  is  possible  that  after  the  full  liberalization  of  rice,  sugar  and  bananas  the  EBA 
agreement might be more effective. Two of the empirical studies describe that these sectors 
are very valuable for some of the LDCs, in particular the sugar sector (Cernat, Laird, Monge-
Raffarello and Turrini, 2003; Jensen and Yu, 2005). Another point worth mentioning is that   19 
the presented empirical studies take into account all LDCs, inclusive the Asian LDCs. As 
previously pointed out, it was expected that these countries will enjoy the greatest benefits 
from the introduction of the EBA scheme because unlike the ACP LDCs they do not have any 
other special or more privileged access to the EU market. In contrast, the ACP LDCs still 
possess the right to export under the Cotonou Agreement, which offers them more flexible 
rules of origin. So, the positive results from the empirical studies can be mainly the result of 
the increase of exports from the Asian LDCs to the EU and not from the ACP LDCs. This 
situation  can  be  explained  with  the  difficulties  these  countries  might  be  experiencing  in 
reorganising their export industries quickly. Using the EBA trade preferences instead of those 
from the Cotonou Agreement means new rules of origins and regulations, which are complex 
and demand some time to be introduced. It is possible that in the long-run more and more 
ACP LDCs will utilise the EBA scheme depending on how much additional costs they will 
have to bear from the change. Hence, an implication for the further trade policy of the EU will 
be to make the rules of origin and cumulation regulations of the EBA arrangement more 
flexible. 
  Still, it is striking that the EBA dummy has a negative impact on the ACP LDCs’ 
exports.  One may explain the lack of substantial influence of the EBA arrangement on the 
export performance of the LDCs with the low supply capacity, poor infrastructure, necessity 
of technical assistance and other “inside the border” problems. It was already earlier pointed 
out the supply-side problems are perhaps the biggest obstacle for LDCs to take up the granted 
preferences. 
On the second question, compared to EBA, ODA shows better performance results, 
although not robust to different model specifications. The results of the Heckman regression 
are considered as the most reliable and according to them aid flows perform better than the 
EBA initiative in relation to the export performance of the ACP LDCs. Despite the various 
critiques  about  the  possible  negative  effect  of  aid  on  the  economic  performance  of  the   20 
receiving country, in this particular case it seems to have a positive impact on the export 
performance of the ACP countries. Considering this argument it should be taken into account 
that  the  ACP  countries  receive  on  average  more  ODA  from  the  EU-15  than  other  DCs 
because of their long-term close economic and political relationship. In addition, some of the 
aid  flows  are  targeted  exactly  at  trade-related  problems  in  the  ACP  countries,  which  is 
perhaps  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  positive  effect  of  ODA  on  exports.  This  finding 
corresponds to the problem discussed - many of the LDCs need not only trade preferences 
but, in the first place, more targeted aid to overcome their initial production situation and lack 
of appropriate infrastructure. Only when they are able to produce and export more goods the 
preferential market access becomes valuable.  
  The third variable of special interest for this study – the interaction term between EBA 
and ODA - has a rather stable coefficient throughout all regressions. The interaction term 
indicating the effect when a country eligible for the EBA scheme received additional aid in 
the previous year has a small but positive effect on export performance. This outcome leads to 
the conclusion that the development strategy of the developed countries, in this case of the 
EU, needs to include both sorts of assistance, aid and trade preferences. The two development 
tools act rather as complements than as substitutes to each other. In this sense one can think of 
a dual development strategy with two interrelated pillars: one representing aid and the second 
trade preferences. More direct aid or technical assistance can be targeted at infrastructure or 
production  facilities  projects  enabling  the  LDCs  to  improve  their  supply  side  conditions, 
which then would give them the chance to take greater advantage of the trade policy. This 
could  be  a  way  to  make  the  EBA  preference  scheme  work  better  and  to  contribute 
significantly to the improvement of the LDCs’ export performance. 
  Finally, the negative result about the effectiveness of the EBA scheme on its own 
brings back the question about the problematic effects of trade preferences in the long-run 
concerning the development of the world trading system and the trade policy of the LDCs.   21 
Similar to the infant-industry protection, once introduced it is very difficult to be removed 
because the beneficiaries will always try to keep the protection. Additionally exists the threat 
of pushing LDCs to specialize in the production of certain products only on the basis of the 
highest preference margin and not according to their comparative advantages (Borrell and 
Stoeckel, 2001; Reinhardt and Özden, 2005). In such cases the beneficiary countries would be 
dependent on the existence of trade preferences because in their absence the exports would be 
not competitive on the world market. To avoid such problems it is perhaps better to advise 
against such trade preference schemes or at least make them more conform to the WTO rules.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to examine the influence of the EBA preferences on the ACP 
LDCs’ export performance and to compare the impact of the EBA scheme with the effect of 
official development assistance. The economic and political effects of preferential access for 
DCs  to  developed  countries’  markets  and  particularly  the  EU  have  been  of  controversial 
nature.  These  effects  refer  to  the  situation  inside  the  beneficiary  country  such  as  supply 
constraints and “behind the border” problems as well as impacts on third countries and on the 
development of the multilateral trade negotiations. Many arguments can be made against the 
implementation  of  trade  preferences  as  a  development  strategy  because  of  its  possible 
slowing-down and deforming influence in the long-run. Besides, it is doubtful whether DCs 
and especially LDCs can benefit from the granted preferential access at all. As shown in the 
case of ACP LDCs, which enjoy the broadest and preferable access to the EU market, there 
were  none,  at  least  until  now,  substantial  increases  or  improvements  in  their  export 
performance. The only group of countries, which has benefited from the introduction of the 
EBA scheme so far, is perhaps the group of the Asian LDCs.  
  The  main  conclusion,  which  can  be  drawn  from  the  empirical  analysis,  is  that 
eligibility for the EBA scheme alone does not contribute to the increase of the exports of the   22 
ACP LDCs. Therefore, it is questionable whether non-reciprocal preference schemes should 
be used as a replacement to aid flows in this particular case. It is possible that with additional 
aid flows the infrastructure and supply capacity in the LDCs can be advanced and in this way 
the exports of LDCs will be enhanced. But the negative effects on third countries, such as 
trade diversion, and on the multilateral trade liberalization will remain. Especially, when the 
eligible countries succeed to increase their exports, the trade diversion effect will become 
even bigger. This raises the question whether it is worth threatening the development of the 
developing region as a whole and also the objectives and principles of the WTO. The focus of 
the solution should lie not only in the short-run results but mainly in the sustainability in the 
long-run. In this sense the development strategy should be conform to all core principles of 
the WTO and contribute to the economic development of DCs with the least possible losses 
for other countries.  
 
NOTES    
 
1 A developing country is determined as a LDC according to three criteria, which take into account the general national 
income of the country, the indicators of the Human Assets Index and the Economic Vulnerability Index 
(http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm). 
2 Initially, an exception for rice, sugar and fresh bananas has been introduced. The liberalization of these products has 
followed a gradual process, starting in 2001 and ending in September 2009 (Art. 12 EC No.980/2005). 
3 HS8 denotes Harmonized System Classification with products disaggregated at 8-digits level. 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-arms/index_en.htm. 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-arms/index_en.htm. 
6 After 2008 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are meant to replace the existing trade regime by reciprocal 
agreements that are fully compatible with WTO rules. 
7The utility ratio is the ratio of imports that really enter under the preference regime to all dutiable imports. 
8 Timor-Leste gained officially independence in 2002. During 2003 the country became member of the ACP group and with 
it accessed the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. Therefore, Timor-Leste is added in the dataset as ACP and LDC country 
from 2003 onwards. 
9 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
10 http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/. 
11 We use mirror statistics, namely imports reported by each EU country in current Euros converted into dollars using the 
bilateral exchange rate $/€. 
12 http://stats.oecd.org/qwids. 
13 The division is made according to the results obtained from single t-test to compare the coefficients obtained in the fixed 
effects and random effects models. When the difference between the coefficients is statistically significant, the variable is 
classified as endogenous. See Wooldrige (2002), Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data, page 290. 
14 Results are available upon request. 
15 Alternatively, we replace the ODA variable by a dummy variable that takes the value of one when aid is positive and zero 
otherwise. Also in this way we are able to estimate the model with all the observations. The results are similar and show that 
countries that receive aid export more and that countries receiving aid that are eligible for the EBA regime have a higher 
possibility to have positive exports. 
16 Results are available upon request. 
17 Results are available upon request.   23 
 TABLES 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Exports  10435  13.86279  3.584209  0.067659  22.62336 
GDPj  12750  21.13228  1.747081  16.28049  26.21239 
GDPi  12915  26.52476  1.231008  23.49279  28.55258 
POPj  12915  14.24148  2.397114  7.397562  18.76679 
POPi  12915  16.36403  1.337698  12.91325  18.22875 
Distance  12915  8.903302  0.418459  7.776782  9.805546 
ODA  7234  13.98434  2.479209  9.21034  21.51213 
Note: Exports denotes bilateral exports from the ACP countries to the EU, GDPj and GDPi denote GDP in the exporter and 
importer  countries,  respectively, P O P j  a n d  POPi  denote  population  in  the  exporter  and  importer  countries  respectively, 
Distance is the distance between countries j and i, ODA is official development aid (disbursements) given by each EU donor 
to each ACP recipient country.    24 
Table 2. Simple Correlations 
 
   Exports GDPj  GDPi  POPj  POPi  Distance ODA  Colony Island  Landlocked Commonlang EBA 
Exports  1                        
GDPj  0.431  1                      
GDPi  0.436  -0.147  1                    
POPj  0.267  0.760  -0.196  1                  
POPi  0.451  -0.154  0.985  -0.197  1                
Distance  -0.029  0.038  -0.048  -0.188  -0.062  1              
ODA  0.335  0.251  0.235  0.409  0.214  -0.095  1            
Colony  0.233  -0.082  0.258  -0.133  0.264  0.005  0.294  1          
Island  -0.077  -0.264  0.107  -0.517  0.107  0.371  -0.311  0.068  1        
Landlocked  -0.075  -0.043  -0.038  0.195  -0.041  -0.086  0.138  -0.031  -0.303  1      
Commonlang 0.095  -0.057  -0.037  -0.080  -0.047  -0.009  0.226  0.604  0.025  0.022  1    
EBA  -0.201  -0.119  0.021  0.135  -0.047  -0.185  0.117  -0.030  -0.124  0.137  -0.014  1 
Note: Exports denotes bilateral exports from the ACP countries to the EU, GDPj and GDPi denote GDP of the exporter and 
importer  countries,  respectively,  POPj a n d  POPi d e n o t e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n t h e  e x p o r t e r  a n d  i m p o r t e r  c o u n t r i e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
Distance is the distance between countries j and i, ODA is development aid given by each EU donor to each ACP recipient 
country, Colony is a dummy that takes the value of one when the countries j and i have had a colonial relationship in the past, 
Island is a dummy that takes the value of one when country j is an island, Landlocked is a dummy that takes the value of one 
when country j is a landlocked country, Commonlang is a dummy that takes the value of one when the countries j and i have 
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Table 3: Estimation Results 
 



















EBA and ODA 
Exporter GDP  0.889***  0.996***    0.765***  0.809***    0.803***  0.848*** 
  (14.031)  (13.128)    (6.786)  (6.082)    (11.153)  (10.338)    
Importer GDP  -0.888**  -0.598    -1.117  -0.279    -1.901***  -0.921**  
  (-2.553)  (-1.293)    (-1.511)  (-0.323)    (-5.576)  (-2.149)    
Exporter POP  0.274***  0.133*    0.274  -0.721    0.408***  0.473*** 
  (4.716)  (1.708)    (0.581)  (-0.779)    (2.794)  (2.951)    
Importer POP  2.263***  1.994***    -2.196  -1.178    3.395***  2.711*** 
  (6.942)  (4.585)    (-0.618)  (-0.298)    (8.800)  (5.684)    
Distance  -0.529***  -0.591**           -        -    -0.002  1.110    
  (-2.833)  (-2.353)          (-0.002)  (1.442)    
Colonial 
History 
1.084***  0.945***           -        -    0.635  0.229    
  (3.457)  (2.765)                  (0.645)  (0.268)    
Island  0.111  0.151           -        -    0.093  0.068    
  (0.646)  (0.635)                 (0.184)  (0.129)    
Landlocked  -0.398**  -0.351*           -        -    -0.478  -0.447    
  (-2.185)  (-1.800)                 (-0.938)  (-1.030)    
Common 
language 
0.769***  0.803***           -        -    1.142*  1.363**  
  (3.382)  (3.150)                 (1.729)  (2.263)    
EBA  -0.315***  -1.612***    -0.265**  -1.577***    -0.279***  -1.587*** 
  (-2.934)  (-3.776)    (-2.461)  (-3.591)    (-2.786)  (-6.154)    
ODA    0.002      -0.022      -0.021    
    (0.115)      (-1.074)      (-1.260)    
ODA*EBA    0.086***      0.090***      0.087*** 
    (3.115)      (3.154)      (5.306)    
1997  0.004  -0.021    0.050  0.017    0.074  0.008    
  (0.078)  (-0.362)    (0.742)  (0.243)    (1.182)  (0.108)    
1998  0.069  0.094    0.142  0.142    0.186***  0.124    
  (1.025)  (1.295)    (1.579)  (1.424)    (2.620)  (1.581)    
1999  -0.100  -0.183**    -0.004  -0.119    0.056  -0.148*   
  (-1.218)  (-2.004)    (-0.030)  (-0.891)    (0.706)  (-1.669)    
2000  -0.111  -0.170    0.015  -0.099    0.108  -0.126    
  (-1.105)  (-1.449)    (0.094)  (-0.525)    (1.105)  (-1.133)    
2001  0.073  0.042    0.210  0.069    0.317***  0.059    
  (0.573)  (0.285)    (1.075)  (0.302)    (2.603)  (0.414)    
2002  0.021  -0.093    0.209  -0.041    0.317**  -0.061    
  (0.154)  (-0.570)    (0.958)  (-0.154)    (2.379)  (-0.387)    
2003  0.105  -0.093    0.339  0.002    0.427***  -0.046    
  (0.719)  (-0.565)    (1.466)  (0.007)    (3.049)  (-0.280)    
2004  0.088  -0.049    0.375  0.103    0.467***  0.043    
  (0.541)  (-0.260)    (1.427)  (0.334)    (3.008)  (0.232)    
2005  0.175  0.015    0.511*  0.184    0.593***  0.110    
  (0.992)  (0.071)    (1.776)  (0.542)    (3.565)  (0.564)    
EBA*2002  0.030  0.119    0.027  0.134    0.025  0.117    
  (0.261)  (0.998)    (0.239)  (1.115)    (0.194)  (0.860)    
EBA*2003  -0.054  0.087    -0.065  0.115    -0.068  0.083    
  (-0.447)  (0.703)    (-0.535)  (0.918)    (-0.528)  (0.614)    
EBA*2004  -0.075  -0.036    -0.055  0.011    -0.067  -0.041    
  (-0.529)  (-0.247)    (-0.386)  (0.073)    (-0.522)  (-0.298)    
EBA*2005  -0.251*  -0.207    -0.229  -0.121    -0.243*  -0.195    
  (-1.739)  (-1.378)    (-1.562)  (-0.784)    (-1.876)  (-1.436)    
Constant  -18.645***  -21.436***    59.727  35.773    -15.324  -41.318*** 
  (-4.412)  (-3.860)    (1.244)  (0.670)    (-1.389)  (-3.880)    
R-squared  0.504  0.497    0.029  0.085                     
N  10419  6097    10419  6097    10419  6097    
Note: *** Denotes significance at 1% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; * denotes significance at 10% level.   
t-statistics in parentheses.  
   26 
 
Table 4: Heckman Results 
 
                EBA        EBA and ODA  EBA, ODA and ODA*EBA 
  Exports  Select  Exports  Select  Exports  Select 
Exporter GDP  0.949***  0.281***  1.036***  0.375***  1.032***  0.374*** 
  (29.538)  (13.233)  (25.551)  (8.571)  (25.451)  (8.543) 
Importer GDP  -0.395***  0.561***  -0.968***  0.387*  -0.956***  0.369* 
  (-2.843)  (6.626)  (-4.145)  (1.803)  (-4.094)  (1.716) 
Exporter POP  0.279***  0.174***  -0.023  0.096**  -0.018  0.098** 
  (10.039)  (9.586)  (-0.608)  (2.287)  (-0.484)  (2.330) 
Importer POP  1.890***  0.195***  2.172***  0.440**  2.162***  0.457*** 
  (14.018)  (2.713)  (9.635)  (2.524)  (9.597)  (2.614) 
Distance  -0.708***  -0.555***  -0.454***  -0.477***  -0.462***  -0.496*** 
  (-8.738)  (-11.301)  (-4.363)  (-4.478)  (-4.434)  (-4.616) 
Colonial History  1.657***  0.095  1.156***  0.249  1.159***  0.237 
  (17.091)  (0.747)  (10.359)  (0.761)  (10.394)  (0.728) 
Island  0.061  0.447***  0.117  0.709***  0.113  0.717*** 
  (0.826)  (10.814)  (1.190)  (6.695)  (1.151)  (6.748) 
Landlocked  -0.292***  0.030  -0.179**  0.034  -0.182**  0.038 
  (-4.319)  (0.580)  (-2.385)  (0.439)  (-2.434)  (0.486) 
EBA  -0.929***  -0.604***  -1.279***  -0.712**  -1.833***  -1.611*** 
  (-5.420)  (-5.111)  (-6.196)  (-2.498)  (-4.106)  (-3.227) 
ODA      0.176***  0.092***  0.164***  0.067*** 
      (10.665)  (5.320)  (8.833)  (3.205) 
ODA*EBA          0.039  0.071** 
          (1.408)  (2.188) 
1997  -0.015  0.004  -0.099  0.102  -0.099  0.103 
  (-0.147)  (0.068)  (-0.728)  (0.802)  (-0.726)  (0.820) 
1998  0.022  0.012  0.082  0.141  0.080  0.140 
  (0.211)  (0.186)  (0.599)  (1.087)  (0.578)  (1.087) 
1999  -0.149  0.210***  -0.233*  0.334**  -0.236*  0.335** 
  (-1.420)  (3.009)  (-1.660)  (2.397)  (-1.680)  (2.414) 
2000  -0.172  0.132*  -0.138  0.274*  -0.144  0.277* 
  (-1.592)  (1.868)  (-0.941)  (1.909)  (-0.980)  (1.936) 
2001  0.306**  0.439***  0.665***  0.709**  0.656***  0.696** 
  (2.166)  (4.439)  (3.382)  (2.550)  (3.339)  (2.510) 
2002  0.228  0.565***  0.523***  1.445***  0.514**  1.428*** 
  (1.605)  (5.419)  (2.615)  (3.314)  (2.572)  (3.288) 
2003  0.290**  0.517***  0.568***  1.133***  0.561***  1.127*** 
  (2.016)  (4.940)  (2.831)  (3.157)  (2.797)  (3.144) 
2004  0.235  0.385***  0.488**  0.943***  0.479**  0.930*** 
  (1.594)  (3.662)  (2.319)  (2.934)  (2.278)  (2.901) 
2005  0.304**  0.235**  0.611***  0.432*  0.605***  0.422* 
  (2.038)  (2.233)  (2.963)  (1.687)  (2.931)  (1.653) 
EBA*2002  -0.002  0.030  0.130  -0.383  0.128  -0.377 
  (-0.007)  (0.184)  (0.469)  (-0.738)  (0.463)  (-0.729) 
EBA*2003  -0.039  -0.062  0.095  -0.207  0.091  -0.207 
  (-0.171)  (-0.378)  (0.347)  (-0.460)  (0.329)  (-0.459) 
EBA*2004  -0.158  0.110  -0.051  0.119  -0.058  0.121 
  (-0.685)  (0.672)  (-0.183)  (0.285)  (-0.210)  (0.288) 
EBA*2005  -0.341  0.173  -0.273  0.166  -0.289  0.161 
  (-1.479)  (1.065)  (-0.994)  (0.453)  (-1.052)  (0.439) 
Common language    0.390***    0.417***    0.411*** 
    (7.045)    (4.438)    (4.366) 
Constant  -25.255***  -20.377***  -16.296***  -22.435***  -16.190***  -21.765*** 
  (-14.384)  (-16.703)  (-6.040)  (-7.173)  (-5.998)  (-6.927) 
N  10419  12750  6097  6548  6097  6548 
Note: *** Denotes significance at 1% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; * denotes significance at 10% level.   
t-statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Robustness  
      ODA in million $                               LDCs    FE 
   Exports  Select  Exports  Select  Exports  Select  ODA  -0.015 
Exporter GDP  0.896***  0.288***  0.650***  0.053  0.695***  0.171***    (-0.754) 
  (27.015)  (12.769)  (10.404)  (1.416)  (9.195)  (2.740)  EBA  0.915 
Importer GDP  -0.407***  0.640***  -0.674***  0.938***  -1.465*** 1.041***    (0.477) 
  (-2.625)  (6.984)  (-3.335)  (7.928)  (-4.607)  (4.049)  ODA*EBA 0.075*** 
Exporter POP  0.251***  0.149***  0.375***  0.277***  0.228***  0.249***    (3.348) 
  (8.653)  (7.671)  (6.463)  (8.371)  (3.207)  (4.056)  Constant  14.249*** 
Importer POP  1.806***  0.105  2.056***  -0.112  2.651***  -0.105    (22.246) 
  (12.120)  (1.376)  (10.461)  (-1.128)  (8.559)  (-0.507)  R-squared  0.00106 
Distance  -0.627***  -0.568***  -0.550***  -0.397***  -0.417*** -0.392***  N  6097 
  (-7.702)  (-10.825)  (-4.854)  (-5.817)  (-2.961)  (-3.221)  ll  -8634.236 
Colonial History  1.504***  -0.025  1.482***  0.913***  1.003***  4.416  rmse  1.163208 
  (16.157)  (-0.171)  (10.523)  (3.349)  (6.304)  (0.043)     
Island  0.011  0.450***  0.013  0.160**  0.192  0.514***     
  (0.147)  (10.135)  (0.101)  (2.062)  (1.297)  (3.854)     
Landlocked  -0.286***  0.001  -0.242***  -0.038  -0.085  0.025     
  (-4.094)  (0.025)  (-2.882)  (-0.636)  (-0.912)  (0.298)     
EBA  -0.880***  -0.638***  -0.400**  -0.269**  -1.598*** -0.984**     
  (-5.096)  (-5.178)  (-2.354)  (-2.459)  (-2.841)  (-2.000)     
ODA  0.005***  0.034**      0.128***  0.053**     
  (4.294)  (2.115)      (4.362)  (2.107)     
ODA*EBA  -0.002  0.050*      0.089**  0.058     
  (1.037)  (1.958)      (2.544)  (1.636)     
1997  0.000  0.025  0.073  -0.058  -0.089  0.119     
  (0.000)  (0.339)  (0.488)  (-0.635)  (-0.474)  (0.787)     
1998  0.035  0.040  0.044  -0.047  0.057  0.127     
  (0.296)  (0.543)  (0.292)  (-0.505)  (0.300)  (0.825)     
1999  -0.155  0.228***  -0.211  0.012  -0.261  0.151     
  (-1.311)  (2.952)  (-1.399)  (0.123)  (-1.350)  (0.944)     
2000  -0.173  0.153*  -0.142  -0.143  -0.138  0.073     
  (-1.432)  (1.905)  (-0.922)  (-1.492)  (-0.683)  (0.440)     
2001  0.290**  0.445***  0.200  0.021  0.164  0.166     
  (1.968)  (4.258)  (1.188)  (0.189)  (0.879)  (1.021)     
2002  0.193  0.565***  0.127  0.160  0.180  0.467***     
  (1.295)  (5.239)  (0.765)  (1.445)  (0.985)  (2.680)     
2003  0.256*  0.515***  0.194  0.039  0.235  0.367**     
  (1.707)  (4.706)  (1.181)  (0.368)  (1.308)  (2.222)     
2004  0.214  0.381***  0.074  0.076  0.063  0.455***     
  (1.367)  (3.471)  (0.455)  (0.700)  (0.355)  (2.684)     
2005  0.295*  0.227**             
  (1.884)  (2.128)             
EBA*2002  -0.006  0.039             
  (-0.024)  (0.233)             
EBA*2003  -0.015  -0.057             
  (-0.066)  (-0.334)             
EBA*2004  -0.189  0.098             
  (-0.807)  (0.587)             
EBA*2005  -0.371  0.160             
  (-1.572)  (0.967)             
Common Language   0.347***    0.402***    0.349***     
    (6.232)    (5.082)    (3.190)     
Constant  -22.593***  -20.752***  -17.461*** -23.393*** -7.705**  -29.082***    
  (-12.447)  (-15.683)  (-6.783)  (-13.695)  (-2.095)  (-7.654)     
N  9510  11566  5367  6570  3676  4050     
 Note: Heckman estimation with ODA in million US dollars and only for LDCs. Fixed Effects (FE) estimation with exporter-
and-time and importer-and-time fixed effects. *** Denotes significance at 1% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; * 
denotes significance at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.   28 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1. List of Exporter and Importer Countries 
Exporter (ACP) Country  Exporter (ACP) Country  Importer (EU-15) Country 
Angola (LDC)  Malawi (LDC)  Austria 
Antigua & Barbuda  Mali (LDC)  Belgium 
Bahamas  Marshall Islands  Denmark 
Barbados  Mauritania (LDC)  Finland 
Belize  Mauritius  France 
Benin (LDC)  Federal States of Micronesia  Germany 
Botswana  Mozambique (LDC)  Greece 
Burkina Faso (LDC)  Namibia  Ireland 
Burundi (LDC)  Nauru  Italy 
Cameroon  Niger (LDC)  Luxembourg 
Cape Verde (LDC)
18  Nigeria  The Netherlands 
Central African Republic (LDC)  Niue  Portugal 
Chad (LDC)  Palau  Spain  
Comoros (LDC)  Papua New-Guinea  Sweden  
Congo  Rwanda (LDC)  United Kingdom 
Cook Islands  Samoa (LDC) 
Cote d'Ivoire  Sao Tome and Principe (LDC) 
Cuba  Senegal (LDC)
19 
Democratic Republic of Congo (LDC)  Seychelles 
Djibouti (LDC)  Sierra Leone (LDC) 
Dominica  Solomon Islands (LDC) 
Dominican Republic  Somalia (LDC) 
Equatorial Guinea (LDC)  South Africa 
Eritrea (LDC)  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Ethiopia (LDC)  St. Kitts and Nevis 
Fiji  St. Lucia 
Gabon  Sudan (LDC) 
Gambia (LDC)  Suriname 
Ghana  Swaziland 
Grenada  Tanzania (LDC) 
Guinea (LDC)  Timor-Leste (LDC)
20 
Guinea-Bissau (LDC)  Togo (LDC) 
Guyana  Tonga 
Haiti (LDC)  Trinidad and Tobago 
Jamaica  Tuvalu (LDC) 
Kenya  Uganda (LDC) 
Kiribati (LDC)  Vanuatu (LDC) 
Lesotho (LDC)  Zambia (LDC) 
Liberia (LDC)  Zimbabwe 




18 Cape Verde graduated from the LDC list in December 2007. 
19 Senegal has been added to the LDC list in 2000. 
20 Timor-Leste has been added to the ACP countries and LDC list in 2003. 